The claimant in this case was an employee of Plas Coch Holiday Home Park (Plas Coch). In 2007, Plas Coch decided to organise a trip around the coast of Anglesey to observe areas of scenic and wildfire interest, and the claimant was part of the party for the excursion. Plas Coch booked three rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) from Menai RIB Ventures for this purpose. Two of these boats were directly supplied by Menai RIB Ventures, while they arranged for the defendant to supply the third boat. At the beginning of the trip, while the party was at Moel-y-Don, one pf the skippers provided a briefing that included an instruction for passengers to remain seated during the voyage. The party then embarked on the boats, with eight individuals on board the Sea Eagle. The defendant gave an additional safety briefing, emphasising that all passengers should remain seated during the passage.

The claimant was standing up when the boat hit a wave, causing him to be thrown about and sustain injury. He alleges that the defendant was negligent for: i) failing to provide a safety briefing before setting off or during the trip; ii) failing to advise the claimant not to stand up in the boat; iii) failing to advise that the boat was heading into the Menai Strait where the water was rougher; and iv) failing to operate the boat in a manner that prevented passengers from being knocked over and providing sufficient safety handholds.

On the other hand, the defendant contends that: i) proper briefings were given; ii) passengers were told not to stand up when the vessel was underway; and iii) the claimant was instructed to sit down when he did stand up.

Furthermore, the defendant argued that the claim was time-barred by virtue of art 16 of the Athens Convention, which prescribes a two-year time limit on any 'action for damages arising out of the death of or personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damage to luggage'.

The claimant accepted that the Athens Convention would be applicable if the Sea Eagle qualified as a ship for the purposes of the Convention. The claimant, however, submitted that the Sea Eagle did not qualify because it was not a seagoing ship. Therefore, it followed that the claimant was not a passenger on board a ship as defined within the Convention, and it further followed that the two-year time bar would not apply.

Held: The Athens Convention applies, and the claim is time-barred.

Article 3 of the Athens Convention provides that '"ship" means only a seagoing vessel, excluding an air-cushion vehicle'. The Court considered various definitions of a ship under local legislation as well as the LLMC 1976.

The Court also considered several cases, including Steedman v Scofield [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 163. The issue in this case was whether, for the purposes of the Collision Convention 1910, a jet ski was a ship used in navigation. Sheen J held that it was not. In McEwan v Bingham [2000] CLY 49, it was held that an inflatable 'banana raft' was not a seagoing vessel for the purposes of the Athens Convention. Furthermore, the Court found that the contract in which the claimant was carried on the banana boat was not a contract of carriage under the Athens Convention. The Court here also found that the word 'seagoing' suggested something more than progressing a short distance up and down a bay and that, applying a purposive approach to the Athens Convention, the contract of carriage should be for some sort of voyage rather than a contract for an enjoyable ride.

The Court held that in order for the Athens Convention to apply, the structure, object, or craft must fulfil two requirements. The first is that it must be a ship or vessel, and the second is that it must be sea-going. If both requirements are not fulfilled, the Convention will not apply. 'Ship' under the first requirement includes any vessel used in navigation or capable of being used in navigation, regardless of whether it is actually being used for such a reason at the relevant time. There may be structures that are ships which are capable and designed to be used in navigation but may not actually be used in that capacity and may not have been for some time. This is in contrast to structures, objects or craft that were not designed as ships or vessels or may not have been intended for use in navigation. Examples of such structures are gas floats and floating stages.

The sensible starting point is to ask whether the construction of the object is capable of being a vessel that may be used in navigation. The Court found that the Sea Eagle fulfilled both these requirements. It was certified as a small commercial vessel under the relevant legislation; furthermore, even if it was not, it was clear that the RIB was of a design and construction intended to be capable of operating offshore. Additionally, the manufacturers' and builders' description of the roles of the RIB included its characterisation as a vessel to be used in navigation. Although handling the vessel on the open sea might have been 'fun', it was designed for serious purposes, which included the planned or ordered movement from one place to another.

Finally, the Court considered whether the Sea Eagle was a seagoing ship. It stated that the relevant question was whether the particular ship does go to sea and not whether it can go to sea. Therefore, the answer depends on what is regarded as being sea and what is not. However, the Court emphasised that it is important to recall that although the Athens Convention is restricted to international carriage, nonetheless SI 1987/670 has extended its applicability to voyages or trips where both the place of departure and the destination are within the United Kingdom. Therefore, trips along the coastlines of the United Kingdom are generally included within the scope of the Convention. The Court held that the Sea Eagle was 'seagoing' for the purposes of the Convention. Therefore, its provisions applied and the claim was statute-barred.