The Australian plaintiffs, who owned the sullage barge Norwhale, initiated a damage claim against the defendant, the Ministry of Defence, which owned and operated the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle. The plaintiffs alleged that on 17 February, 1968, the Norwhale was brought alongside the HMS Eagle in the harbour to collect oily water. On that day, the Norwhale took a quantity of water from the HMS Eagle and remained next to it overnight, intending to collect more the following day. During the night, the HMS Eagle discharged water or other liquids from numerous openings on its side onto the deck of the Norwhale. This caused the Norwhale to list and allowed additional water from the harbour to enter, ultimately resulting in the sinking of the Norwhale. Subsequently, the harbour authority raised and detained the Norwhale.

Following the sinking, the plaintiffs filed an action against the defendant, seeking GBP 30,000 for the costs of raising the Norwhale, repairs, and loss of use. They claimed that this loss was solely due to the negligence of those on board the HMS Eagle. However, the writ in this action was issued five and a half years after the casualty occurred.

The defendant applied for a declaration that the action was not maintainable, citing s 8 of the Maritime Conventions Act 1911 (UK) (the Act).

Held: Judgment for the defendant.

The Court observed that the dispute between the parties revolved around whether s 8 of the Act applied. This hinged on the true interpretation of the Act, specifically whether the general words in certain enacting provisions should be interpreted in accordance with the express purpose of the Act. This purpose was to give effect to two international Conventions: the Collision Convention 1910 and the Salvage Convention 1910.

The relevant provisions are:

Section 1(1): 'Where, by the fault of two or more vessels, damage or loss is caused to one or more of those vessels, to their cargos or freight, or to any property on board, the liability to make good the damage or loss shall be in proportion to the degree in which each vessel was in fault'

Section 8: 'No action shall be maintainable to enforce any claim or lien against a vessel or her owners in respect of any damage or loss to another vessel, her cargo or freight, or any property on board her, … caused by the fault of the former vessel, whether such vessel be wholly or partly in fault, or in respect of any salvage services, unless proceedings therein are commenced within two years from the date when the damage or loss … was caused or the salvage services were rendered'

Section 9 contains a proviso regarding the extension of the two-year period in certain cases.

The plaintiffs argued that ss 1(1) and 8 applied only to cases where damage or loss by one vessel to another occurred due to an actual collision within art 1 of the Collision Convention, or due to navigational fault within art 13 of the Convention; ie by execution or non-execution of a manoeuvre or by the non-observance of regulations. Therefore, since the fault alleged against the HMS Eagle was not a navigational fault, but rather a management fault unrelated to navigation, s 8 did not apply.

The defendant countered that the words used in ss 1(1) and 8, in their ordinary and natural meaning, were broad enough to cover all cases of damage or loss caused by one vessel to another due to the negligence of the former vessel. This applied regardless of whether a collision occurred, and regardless of whether the fault was related to navigation or management. Consequently, there was no justification for restricting their application in non-collision cases to instances of navigational fault covered by art 13 of the Convention.

The Court held that ss 1(1) and 8 of the Act must be construed within the context in which they are found and not in isolation. This context encompasses the preamble and the Conventions referenced in it, as well as the headings of the three groups of sections into which the Act is divided. However, courts should refrain from restricting the interpretation of general words in the enacting provisions based on the context unless there is a compelling reason to do so. The mere fact that such words extend beyond what the preamble suggests is not, on its own, a compelling reason.

The Court held that the words 'by the fault of two or more vessels' in s 1(1) and 'by the fault of the former vessel' in s 8 are broadly general and wide enough to include, in their ordinary and natural meaning, both navigational faults and other types of faults. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a more limited interpretation should be applied, one that aligned with the provisions of the Collision Convention 1910 and did not go beyond what the preamble implied. The Court held that this argument alone did not constitute a compelling reason for the proposed restriction. There were other valid reasons why the legislature, when implementing the provisions of the Collision Convention 1910 regarding liability apportionment and the two-year claims time limit, should have applied those provisions to a broader range of cases than the Convention itself. One such reason was the belief that the distinction between navigational and other faults was not significant concerning the Convention's purposes.

The Court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had relied on the decisions of Salomon v Customs & Excise Commissioners [1967] 2 QB 116, Post Office v Estuary Radio [1968] 2 QB 740, and The Banco [1971] P 137 (CMI2156). The principle established by these cases is that when a provision in a statute, intended to incorporate an international Convention, is capable of two interpretations - one that allows the country to fulfil its international obligations and another that does not - the former interpretation should be preferred.

However, the Court held that, even though it recognised that the words under the cross-heading 'Collision, etc' are capable of more than one interpretation, it cannot be argued that giving them, along with the word 'fault' in ss 1(1) and 8, the broader meaning advocated by the defendant violated the country's international obligations concerning the Collision Convention. Such an interpretation merely signifies that this country has applied the Convention's provisions to certain cases not covered by the Convention, in addition to those that are covered. This does not conflict with the Convention since it does not forbid a wider application. This differs from The Banco, where the plaintiffs' proposed interpretation of s 3(4) of the Administration of Justice Act 1956 (UK) (the 1956 Act), if accepted, would have meant that the legislature had granted arrest rights exceeding those allowed by the Arrest Convention 1952, which the 1956 Act was designed to implement.

Further, s 4, and specifically s 4(7) of the 1956 Act, was intended to implement the provisions of arts 1, 3, and 4 of the Collision (Civil Jurisdiction) Convention 1952. Article 4 of this Convention closely resembled the language found in art 13 of the Collision Convention 1910. Additionally, s 4(7) of the 1956 Act substantially reproduced the terms of art 4. This illustrates that in 1956, the legislature believed it was necessary to substantially replicate the wording of the Convention's provisions to ensure that the particular changes in English law aligned with the international Conventions it sought to implement.