Rang Dong Joint Stock Co (the plaintiff) contracted with JF Hillebrand USA Inc​ (the defendant) to ship three containers to Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The bill of lading identified the defendant as 'agent' and Blue Eagle Consolidated Services GmbH (Blue Eagle) as 'carrier'. In addition, the bill of lading identified only 'Ho Chi Minh City', and no particular terminal, as the cargo's destination. The plaintiff alleged that the cargo should have been delivered to Cat Lai Port (a terminal at Ho Chi Minh City). However, without notifying the plaintiff, the destination of cargo was changed to Cai Mep Port (another terminal at Ho Chi Minh City). The cargo remained at Cai Mep Port for eight days before being moved to Cat Lai Port and suffered damage. The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging damages under COGSA/the Hague Rules, a false bill of lading, deviation and breach of fiduciary duty.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The defendant argued that it was not a carrier subject to liability under COGSA/the Hague Rules, but merely an agent for Blue Eagle in issuing the bill of lading. The bill of lading clearly showed that Blue Eagle acted as the carrier. The plaintiff, however, argued that COGSA/the Hague Rules defined 'carrier' as 'the owner, manager, charterer, agent, or master of a vessel', which included the defendant acting as an agent. The defendant responded that the plaintiff mistakenly relied on the definition of 'carrier' under the Harter Act 1893, rather than the definition of 'carrier' under COGSA/the Hague Rules. The actual definition of 'carrier' under COGSA/the Hague Rules should be 'the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper'.

In addition, the defendant argued that the bill of lading only identified the cargo's destination as Ho Chi Minh City, and no particular terminal. Therefore, the plaintiff's claims could not proceed.

Held: Motion granted in part and denied in part.

The Court held that 46 USC §§ 30701-30707 is the recodified version of the Harter Act 1893, not COGSA/the Hague Rules. On the contrary, COGSA/the Hague Rules has not been amended or repealed, and is included in the United States Code as a statutory note following 46 USC § 30701. Therefore, the definition of 'carrier' under COGSA/the Hague Rules should refer to the text of this statutory note alone, which is 'the owner or the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper'. The Court would not refer to the text of 46 USC § 30701.

Nevertheless, nowhere in its complaint did the plaintiff expressly allege the defendant was a 'carrier'. The plaintiff lumped the defendant and Blue Eagle together throughout its complaint, without providing detailed factual allegations that established the status of the defendant as a carrier. Accordingly, the Court found that the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege the defendant was a 'carrier' under COGSA/the Hague Rules, regardless of the definition or test that might apply. Therefore, the defendant's motion was granted in this respect.

However, the Court denied the defendant's motion in the respect that the cargo's destination was ambiguous and the plaintiff's allegations survived at the pleading stage.