On 12 March 2011, the plaintiff was on board the CTMA Vacancier, a vessel operated by the defendant and docked at Souris Wharf, Prince Edward Island. The plaintiff had spent the night there. He intended to return by sea to Cap-aux-Meules, Madeleine Islands, and then to his residence in Fatima, Madeleine Islands. He had previously travelled from the Madeleine Islands by the same means of transport. The contract of carriage was concluded at the defendant's office in the Madeleine Islands. The plaintiff was negotiating a passageway on the vessel when a door was blown shut by the wind and closed abruptly on the index finger of his left hand. The finger later had to be amputated. The plaintiff attributed the accident to a defect in the door restraint system and sought compensation from the defendant.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim was time-barred.

Held: The plaintiff's claim must be dismissed.

The Marine Liability Act incorporates the provisions of the Athens Convention 1974 into Canadian law. In this case, by virtue of the uncontested facts, the plaintiff meets the Athens Convention definition of passenger, that is to say a person transported on a ship, the defendant responds to the Athens Convention definition of a carrier and the event causing injury resulting from bodily harm complained of by the plaintiff took place during transport, while the passenger was on board the vessel. In short, the context leads to the conclusion that the plaintiff's claim falls under Canadian maritime law.

The Marine Liability Act sets a two-year limitation period for an action for bodily injury and sets the starting point from the time of disembarkation of the passenger. Here, the plaintiff disembarked from the defendant's ship on 12 March 2011. His claim was time-barred on 12 March 2013. If it had to be considered that the starting point of the limitation period coincided with the time when the plaintiff knew the essential conditions for the existence of the defendant's liability, namely the fault, the damage and the connection between these two elements, the Court would arrive at the same result.

As permitted under s 16(3) of Sch 2 to the Marine Liability Act, the plaintiff is entitled to rely on the limitation period having been interrupted or suspended. Interruption or suspension is governed by the law of the court seised, in this case the law of Quebec, the Civil Code of Quebec (CCQ).

Interruption is provided for in art 2892 of the CCQ: 'The filing of a legal claim, before the expiry of the limitation period, forms a civil interruption, provided that such a request is served on the person whom it is wished to prevent from prescribing, at the latest in the 60 days which follow the expiration of the limitation period.' The plaintiff filed his originating motion on 4 December 2013 after the expiry of the limitation period. He did not interrupt it.

Article 2904 of the CCQ provides for the causes of suspension of the prescription that might be applicable to the plaintiff's situation: 'Prescription does not run against persons who are unable in fact to act either on their own or by being represented by others.' The plaintiff argues that he was not able to actually quantify his claim before receiving the medical expert's assessment on 14 November 2013. However, the doctrine and jurisprudence recognise that extinctive prescription begins to run as soon as the injury is known, although the actual extent of the damage is unknown. In short, the plaintiff does not raise any valid reason for the suspension of the limitation period. It must therefore be held that the defendant is correct to point out that the plaintiff's action is prescribed and that the plaintiff's motion to institute proceedings must be dismissed.