Amazon Produce Network LLC (the plaintiff) arranged for mangoes to be shipped by Muranaka Comercio Import Export Ltda (the shipper) from Salvador, Brazil, to Houston, Texas, with Montemar Maritima SA (the defendant). The defendant chartered space for the mangoes on the Lykes Osprey. The defendant informed the plaintiff and the shipper that the vessel would depart the port of Bahia in Salvador on 29 August 2005. The plaintiff was advised to have the mangoes ready at the port for loading and departure by 26 August 2005.

On 23 August 2005, the defendant informed the plaintiff and the shipper that the vessel's arrival would be delayed to 31 August 2005. The plaintiff claimed that, based on this information, the mangoes were specifically harvested two days before 31 August 2005 for shipment, and that the mangoes were packed in two shipping containers and delivered to the port in preparation for loading onto the vessel.

However, the vessel did not arrive until 9 September 2005. Neither the plaintiff nor the shipper was informed of this further delay. The vessel departed that same day for Houston via the Gulf of Mexico with the mangoes onboard.

On 18 September 2005, tropical storm Rita had developed into a category three hurricane in the Gulf of Mexico. On 21 September 2005, the port of Houston was closed due to the bad weather. To avoid the storm, the vessel diverted to Altamira, Mexico, and discharged its cargo to await the reopening of the Houston port.

According to the plaintiff, the plaintiff and the shipper were informed that the mangoes were to be loaded onto the TMM Colina to bring the mangoes from Altamira to Houston. However, the defendant arranged for the mangoes to be loaded on another vessel instead (the Libra Santos) to complete the carriage to Houston. The plaintiff claimed that this discrepancy caused additional delay, as the plaintiff had to obtain amended documentation from the authorities.

On 7 October 2005, the Libra Santos arrived in Houston. On 8 October 2005, the mangoes were discharged with a post-harvest age of approximately 40 days, far longer than the 25-day limit recommended by the authorities. On 13 October 2005, the plaintiff, as the consignee, retrieved the mangoes and found them to be in a significantly deteriorated condition. The plaintiff claimed that the time lag between discharge and retrieval was due to the defendant's failure to communicate that the mangoes were shipped on the Libra Santos, rather than on the TMM Colina.

On 28 September 2006, the plaintiff filed its complaint against the defendant and the Lykes Osprey, alleging that the defendant's breaches as a common carrier caused damage to the mangoes. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was liable under the US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 USC §§ 1300 ff (COGSA) and the Harter Act (46 USC §§ 190 ff) for failing to provide a seaworthy place for the care, handling, stowage, and carriage of the mangoes, and 'did not use proper care under the circumstances'. The plaintiff also asserted that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide information about the route and schedule of the shipment, and that this failure was the proximate cause of the mangoes rotting.

The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that COGSA is the only relevant statute, and that under COGSA, the defendant cannot be held liable as the damage was caused by the bad weather and the natural deterioration of the mangoes over time. The defendant also argued that the bill of lading issued by the defendant for the mangoes contained a 'liberties clause' and other provisions explicitly absolving the defendant of liability for damage due to delay and deviation.

The defendant further argued that the bill of lading included a provision stating that COGSA governed before loading and after discharge.

The plaintiff acknowledged that the bill of lading explicitly extended COGSA beyond its statutory scope, but asserted that the extension provision was ambiguous and only applied in the United States. As such, the Harter Act governed the period of time preceding the loading of the mangoes in Brazil.

The extension provision in the bill of lading was as follows:

The provisions stated in COGSA shall govern the Goods before they are loaded on and after they are discharged from the Vessel and throughout the entire time they are in the custody of the Carrier at a United States port.

Held: Motion for summary judgment denied.

COGSA provides an exclusive remedy for damage to cargo incurred during carriage between foreign and United States ports. It is undisputed that the defendant's actions after loading in Brazil and before discharge in Houston fall within the scope of COGSA. By its terms, COGSA applies to the 'tackle-to-tackle' period from the time when the goods are loaded on the vessel to the time that they are discharged at the final destination, and this period may be extended by parties by contract (46 USC § 30701).

The Court found that the extension provision was not ambiguous and need not be construed against the defendant who drafted it. The plaintiff's interpretation was found to be unreasonable and nonsensical, because the parties knew that the mangoes were to be loaded in Brazil. The Court stated that:

The language of the clause clearly describes COGSA's coverage in two separate situations: (1) 'before [the goods] are loaded on and after they are discharged from the Vessel'; and (2) 'throughout the entire time they are in the custody of the Carrier at a United States port'. This language unambiguously extends COGSA to the period 'before the goods were loaded' in any port, not just those in the United States, and is not subject to multiple interpretations.

Thus, under the bill of lading, COGSA governed the carriage contract between the parties at all relevant times.

The Court set out the following analysis of COGSA:

COGSA sets forth a complex burden-shifting scheme for determining liability for damage to goods incurred during shipping. First, a plaintiff shipper must establish a prima facie case that (1) the cargo was loaded undamaged onto the carrier's ship, and (2) the cargo was damaged when it was unloaded from the ship at the point of destination. […] If the plaintiff succeeds in making out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the carrier to prove that the damage was caused not by its own negligence, but by one of a number of exceptions enumerated in the statute. 46 USC § 30706 […]. At this step, the carrier may also rebut the prima facie case by showing that it exercised due diligence in preventing damage to or loss of the cargo. […] If the carrier succeeds in rebutting the prima facie case, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the carrier's negligence was at least a concurring cause of the loss. […] Should the plaintiff succeed in making such a showing, the burden of proof arrives at its final port with the carrier, who must establish exactly how much loss is attributable to its own negligence, and how much loss is attributable to some other cause, such as the plaintiff's negligence or a cause listed in the statutory exceptions. […]

On the evidence, the Court found that the plaintiff raised sufficient issues of fact as to the defendant's alleged negligence to survive the COGSA standard on summary judgment. There was some evidence to suggest that the defendant was negligent in failing to warn about the initial delay of the vessel's arrival in Brazil. There was an issue as to whether there was a customary practice of informing a shipper in the plaintiff's position about the status of the vessel.

Exception clauses relating to delay and deviation were insufficient for summary judgment. This is because under COGSA, the defendant cannot contract away its liability for damages that arose out of its own negligence. Case law recognised that 'a carrier may not disclaim liability for failure to comply with the duties enumerated under COGSA' and thus the defendant could 'still be liable for damage due to negligence'. The mere existence of a liberties clause is insufficient to defeat liability, as COGSA forbids unreasonable deviations regardless of the parties' agreement. 'Customs and usages of the maritime trade' can be used as a benchmark to determine the reasonableness of a deviation. On the evidence, there was an issue of fact as to whether the defendant's actions in response to the storm and the closure of the port were reasonable.

With summary judgment denied, the matter thereafter proceeded to trial. The Court held in favour of the plaintiff, rejecting the defendant's 'act of God' defence, and finding that it was the defendant's failures to exercise due diligence, and not hurricane Rita, that caused the plaintiff's loss: see Amazon Produce Network LLC v M/V Lykes Osprey 2009 WL 10736593, 2009 US Dist LEXIS 149299.