The Spanish appellant, SA Catafruit (Catafruit), bought pears from an Argentinian company. The goods were stuffed in a reefer container supplied by SA CMA CGM (CMA CGM) and stored in CMA CGM's warehouse. The container was then loaded onto the MSC Carolina for carriage to Spain. The bill of lading issued in Buenos Aires specified that the goods should be kept at a temperature of -1.6° C. The goods were found to be damaged on arrival due to temperature fluctations, and had to be destroyed.

Catafruit brought an action against Sté CMA CGM Iberica SAU (CMA CGM Iberica) in the Commercial Court in Valencia. The Spanish Court declared itself incompetent pursuant to the French jurisdiction clause appearing in the bill of lading.

Catafruit then sued CMA CGM and CMA CGM Iberica in the Commercial Court of Marseille. That Court held that Catafruit's action was time-barred.

Catafruit appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Held: Appeal dismissed.

The appellant argues that the one-year time bar in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules was interrupted by the referral to the Spanish Court, which declared itself incompetent in view of the French jurisdiction clause in the bill of lading. The Commercial Court of Marseille should have examined the rules of prescription with regard to French law and not Spanish law. Alternatively, the appellant argues that a five-year prescription period applies to its action against CMA CGM, both in the latter's capacity as the owner/lessor of the container, which proved unfit to ensure the preservation of the goods, and in its capacity as warehouse keeper.

CMA CGM replies that the five-year prescription period is inapplicable to the case, the provision of a container by the carrier being an accessory to the contract of carriage. The one-year time bar of the Hague-Visby Rules has expired under both Spanish and French law, since the action against CMA CGM Iberica did not interrupt prescription.

On this point, there are no separate contracts concluded between the parties regarding the provision of the container, the storage of the goods, and the transport contract itself. As a consequence, the parties are only bound by the maritime transport contract which includes the ancillary operations of containerisation and storage before loading, as correctly argued by CMA CGM and as held by the Commercial Court of Marseille.

The prescription period applicable to Catafruit's action is that in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules, ie one year from the date of delivery of the goods.

CMA CGM denies any interruption of prescription, arguing, as the Commercial Court of Marseilles held, that under Spanish law a claim brought before a court without jurisdiction does not interrupt prescription.

However, the parties to the bill of lading expressly designated French law as applicable, as well as the jurisdiction of the French courts. Therefore, substantive French law and the French rules of procedure must be applied to the time bar in art 3.6 of the Hague-Visby Rules and art L 5422-18 of the Transport Code, which includes the rules relating to the suspension or interruption of prescription. It was thus incorrect that the Commercial Court of Marseilles availed itself of Spanish law to say that the prescription had not been validly interrupted.

Pursuant to art 2241 of the Civil Code, a legal claim, even when brought before an incompetent court, interrupts the limitation period, provided that the legal claim is addressed to the relevant person.

Here, the bill of lading exclusively identifies CMA CGM as the carrier. CMA CGM Iberica is the Spanish agent of CMA CGM. They are separate legal persons. The appellant has not been demonstrated that they have the same manager, identical activities, or have caused confusion about their respective activities. It is not relevant that the Spanish judge considered that CMA CGM Iberica could rely on the provisions of the bill of lading; the operative part of the Spanish decision contains only a declaration of incompetence in favour of the French courts.

It follows that the Spanish action, which was not directed against CMA CGM, could not interrupt the one-year period that had been running against it since 25 March 2013, and that the action brought by summons of 12 and 13 November 2014 is time-barred.