The appellant, Mauricio Importadora y Exportadora, was a Chilean importing company that, acting through its agent, hired the respondent, Jet Speed Logistics (USA) LLC, a non-vessel operating common carrier, to co-ordinate the overseas shipment of about 3,500 laptop computers from Miami, Florida, to Chile. The respondent arranged for the laptops to be delivered in containers to a warehouse in Miami, transported to Port Everglades, and then loaded onto the ocean carrier. The containers departed the warehouse in Miami on 30 August 2016. When the containers arrived in Chile on 26 September 2016, the appellant discovered that more than 1,200 laptops were missing. The appellant filed suit against the respondent for negligence, conversion and replevin.

The respondent's involvement in the transaction was governed by a bill of lading which provided: 'this Bill of Lading shall have effect subject to the provisions of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act' (COGSA), which 'shall govern before loading on and after discharge from the vessel and throughout the entire time the Goods are in the custody of the Carrier'. The bill contained a limited liability provision of $500 per package and a statute of limitations relieving the carrier of liability 'unless suit is brought within one year'.

Although the respondent's bill of lading expressly incorporated the provisions of COGSA, the appellant never asserted a COGSA claim. Following a jury trial in December 2019, the respondent moved for a directed verdict claiming that the state law causes of action were pre-empted by COGSA and that the claims were time-barred under COGSA's one-year statute of limitations. The trial Court found that the dispute was governed exclusively by COGSA and entered final judgment in favour of the respondent. The appellant appealed, arguing that COGSA is inapplicable to its claims.

Held: The trial Court's directed verdict in favour of the respondent is affirmed.

The agreement here is governed by the bill of lading. 'A bill of lading records that a carrier has received goods from the party that wishes to ship them, states the terms of carriage, and serves as evidence of the contract for carriage.' Norfolk S Ry Co v Kirby, 543 US 14, 18-19, 125 S Ct 385, 160 L Ed 2d 283 (2004) (CMI1454). '[S]o long as a bill of lading requires substantial carriage of goods by sea, its purpose is to effectuate maritime commerce - and thus it is a maritime contract. Its character as a maritime contract is not defeated simply because it also provides for some land carriage.' Id at 27, 125 S Ct 385. While 'COGSA governs bills of lading for the carriage of goods "from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship" ... COGSA also gives the option of extending its rule by contract.' Id at 29, 125 S Ct 385, quoting 46 USC App § 1301(e) (2001); see 46 USC App § 1307: 'Nothing contained in this chapter shall prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any agreement ... as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss or damage to or in connection with the custody and care and handling of goods prior to the loading on and subsequent to the discharge from the ship on which the goods are carried by sea.'

Here, the express terms of the respondent's bill of lading extended COGSA's reach to pre-loading activities, thus bringing the claims under COGSA's scope. 'COGSA, when it applies, supersedes other laws.' Polo Ralph Lauren LP v Tropical Shipping & Const Co Ltd, 215 F3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir 2000) (CMI1536). 'COGSA leaves no state remedy in its wake; it provides an exclusive remedy and is therefore completely preemptive.' Continental Ins Co v Kawasaki Kisen Kasha Ltd, 542 F Supp 2d 1031, 1034 (ND Cal 2008)). The appellant argues that COGSA is void as against public policy in regard to its claim for conversion. However, federal courts have found that 'COGSA's preemption of general maritime and state law remedies extends to claims for conversion.' Jones v Compagnie Generale Mar, 882 F Supp 1079, 1082-83 (SD Ga 1995) (citing Reisman v Medafrica Lines, 592 F Supp 50, 52 (SDNY 1984) stating that 'breach of contract, negligence, and conversion claims are the common law equivalents of the actions for which COGSA was meant to be an exclusive definition of liability in the shipper-carrier context').

Because COGSA was expressly incorporated in the maritime contract governing the shipment of the laptops, it provides the exclusive remedy for the claims in the underlying action. Additionally, the one-year statute of limitations period applies and the appellant is precluded from bringing the action as being time-barred. See Brown v Betty K Agencies (USA) LLC, 61 So 3d 1156, 1157 (Fla 3d DCA 2011) (CMI1391).