On 3 December 2021, the applicant owner of the MT Shin I (aka the MT Guardians) bareboat chartered its vessel to Mael Ship Management Co (MSMC). This charter was for a period of 12 months.

In September 2022, while the vessel was in the custody of MSMC, the plaintiff supplied bunkers and lubricants, receipt of which was acknowledged by the master and chief engineer of the vessel. These goods were not paid for. The plaintiff sought an order for the arrest of the vessel.

Subsequent to the arrest, the applicant entered an appearance as the owner of the vessel and applied for its release. The applicant argued that it was not a party to the agreement between the plaintiff and the agents of MSMC. No lien attached to its vessel. Relying on Shell Oil Co v The Ship 'Lastrogoni' (1974) 131 CLR 1, 5, the applicant argued that 'an action in rem is instituted to compel the appearance of the owner but the vessel is not liable unless the owner is personally liable'.

Held: Application for arrest refused. The vessel is to remain under arrest.

The Court's understanding of the pleadings filed is that the claim is not merely against the owner of the vessel but also the vessel itself. That the owner is absolved of liability does not mean the vessel is. The supply was made to the vessel and is for the vessel to utilise. In shipping law, the vessel itself has a legal personality. It can sue and be sued.

Sierra Leone is a signatory to the Arrest Convention 1952. Sierra Leone signed this Convention on 14 July 1986 and ratified it on 5 August 1987. The Convention entered into force in Sierra Leone on 3 November 1987. Article 3.4 of the Convention states:

When in the case of a charter by demise of a ship the charterer and not the registered owner is liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to that ship, the claimant may arrest such ship or any other ship in the ownership of the charterer by demise, subject to the provisions of this Convention, but no other ship in the ownership of the registered owner shall be liable to arrest in respect of such maritime claim. The provisions of this paragraph shall apply to any case in which a person other than the registered owner of a ship is liable in respect of a maritime claim relating to that ship.

This brings the issue of the arrest of the vessel into perspective. It is clear from this provision that as in this case, where the plaintiff has a claim against the charterer as opposed to the registered owner, the vessel may nonetheless be arrested. The arrest of the vessel was done within the law and the execution of the warrant was not wrongful.

The applicant also seeks an order striking out the writ of summons on the ground that no cause of action has been disclosed. The argument is that the owner of the vessel is not privy to the contract sought to be enforced by the plaintiff in this action. However, the vessel itself is a party to the action. In shipping law, a vessel does have legal personality. It is capable of suing and being sued under the principle of 'ships as legal persons'. In the case of The Halcyon Isle [1981] 1 WLR 1238, the English Court of Appeal held that a ship had a separate legal personality from its owners, and that the ship could be held liable for damage it had caused to a third party. This same principle was applied in the case of The Owners of the Steamship 'Indian Grace' v Owners of the Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Steamship 'Indian Grace' [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep 284, where Saville J held that the vessel had a legal personality and could be held liable for damage caused to the cargo it was carrying. The Court stated that the vessel was a separate legal entity from its owners and that it could be sued in its own name.

Applying this principle leads to the conclusion that where necessaries are supplied to the vessel, it is indebted to the plaintiff for necessaries supplied to it, and consequently a lien will be placed on it until the debt is settled. It is for this reason, among others, that in admiralty matters the vessel is itself personally made a party to the action. In this case, the first defendant is the vessel together with its owner and persons interested in it. By this singular action, the liability of the vessel itself is called into question. As such, generally speaking, the fact that the owner of the vessel and/or persons interested in it plead that they are not liable to the plaintiff does not absolve the vessel of its liability where it is sued in its own name.

The applicant's remedy lies in damages for breach of contract against MSMC and not in securing the release of the vessel. The applicant's remedy does not lie in an application for the release of the vessel so that it can be on its merry way, while leaving the plaintiff worried about whether it could ever be in position to enforce its claim. If the Court should succumb to arguments that would release the vessel to the owner when the supplier clearly supplied based on the understanding that the vessel itself would be security for payment, the shipping industry itself would be unsustainable. For suppliers would insist on upfront payment for goods and services and shores will be littered with vessels far from home in dire need of necessaries. This would not be good for the shipping industry and certainly not good for business and economic growth.

More recent cases have followed this trend of making the owner of chartered vessels liable for the supply of necessaries. In The Rafaela S [2005] EWCA Civ 1030, the Court of Appeal held that the owner of a vessel was liable for bunkers supplied to the vessel by a third party, even though the owner did not personally contract for the supply of those bunkers. The Court held that the bunkers were a necessary expense for the operation of the vessel and therefore fell within the principle of necessaries. The Court also held that the supplier had a maritime lien against the vessel for the value of the bunkers. In The Pacific Champ [2017] EWHC 257 (Comm), the High Court held that the owner of a vessel was liable for port charges and pilotage fees incurred by the vessel, even though the charterer had contracted for the use of the port and the services of the pilot. The Court held that the charges and fees were necessaries for the operation of the vessel and therefore fell within the principle of necessaries. In addition to these cases, the principle of necessaries has been recognized and applied in many other English cases, including The Evia Luck [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 36 and The Tychy [2007] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 423.